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THE PROFESSIONS AND COMPETITION POLICY
H. w. Arthurs
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
Let me begin by broadly identifying my own position.
First, I am broadly in favour of the proposed Competition
Act, the philosophy it expounds, and the mechanisms it
advances to implement that philosophy. Second, I am
concerned - as are most professionals - to assure that
professional services of a high calibre are delivered to
the public at a price everyone can ·afford and through
procedures which make them fully and easily accessible .
Third, I am basically skeptical that the Bill does very
much to secure the public interest in relation to professional service s.

·''

What are the present impediments to the just and
equitable supply of professional services - and what does
the Bill do to protect the public interest?
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First, let me turn to the issue of price fixing.
Through the medium of professional associations, tariffs
of fees - minimum (and occasionally maximum} fees - are
established which either guide or compel the practitioner
in calculating the charges for his services. It is fair
to say that these tariffs are seldom based on "objective"
or "scientific" criteri a. Usually they are designed to
protect or enhance the income level of practitioners .
They are seldom subject to external scrutiny either in the
initial setting of the tariff, or in its application in
any given situation. Of course, there are exceptions, as
for example in the legal profession, where certain tariffs
are established by legislation or by order of the court,
and where some form of independent third party adjudication
is available to review the appropriateness of the fee in
any given case. However, even in these rather exceptional
circumstances, the problem often is that the client does
not know of his right to seek adjudication.
Compliance with the tariff is sometimes secured by
punitive measures. More often, it depends upon voluntary
adherence secured through publicity. Moreover, fee cutting
in violation of tariff is sometimes tolerated provided that
i t is not flagrantly used as a method of attracting a
clientele .
Given the fact that some form of price fixing is
reasonably common in the market for professional ·services,
i t is important next to canvass the justifications advanced
for this practice .
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First of all, i t is urged, the existence of a tariff
protects the client from over-charging by giving him a
guide with which he can predict the likely cost of the
service he seeks , and against which he can measure the bill
received for professional advice. The difficulty with this
position is that since the tariff itself is not subjected
50
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to external scrutiny, there is no guarantee that even a
fee which conforms to the tariff is a fair fee. Moreover,
as has been pointed out, the tariff · usually prescribes
only a minimum fee and a charge in excess of it would not
be (for that reason) improper.
Next, tariffs are defended on the basis that the
client is entitled to the benefit of the best professional
advice available. If he is attracted by an illicit offer
of a saving in the price of the professional service,
rather than on the basis of superior quality, there is a
distortion of his judgment. This defence of tariffs,
however, is hard to sustain in view of the fact that few
professions (especially those which cater to a "lay"
public) have developed ways of identifying their members
by criteria which would help a client select the "right"
practitioner.
Finally, perhaps most persuasively, it is argued that
tariffs are necessary to avoid a situation in which a
professional becomes dependent upon thi.n profit margins
and a high turnover of clients, a . situation which might
tempt him to shave the quality of the service in order to
increase the turnover and thus to secure an "adequate"
living. Yet this defence too poses a host of difficulties.
What, for example, is an "adequate" living: $12 ,000?
$18,000? $30,000? $75,000?
Moreover, the problem of
sub-standard service is an independent one; professional
bodies should (and, to some extent, do) police the quality
of service rendered by their members in any event. And,
as common observation indicates, professionals even without
the pressure of thin profit margins tend to be over-committed and over-extended - perhaps because many of them are
work addicts or driven by professional pride and the enjoyment of their work, rather than by greed or need.
the
new
all
the

Whatever might be the justifications for price fixing,
practice is effectively struck down by section 16 of the
Bill. In the market for professional services, as in
other markets, the rule contemplated by the statute is
rule of competition.

However, the Bill does provide protection for professional fee tariffs established and implemented in accordance with section 92 of the Bill.
In order to qualify for such protection, tariffs or
other forms of conduct which would violate the price
fixing prohibitions must meet three conditions. First,
the profession asserting the claim to immunity must have
been "designated" by either the provincial legislature or
by parliament. Second, no protection is to be afforded to
persons who are engaged in the supply of goods or in the
construction industry, limitations which would seem to deny
protection respectively to pharmacists and civil engineers
and architects. Third, the conduct called into question
must be authorized by a federal or provincial statute, or
a municipal by-·law, and must be subject to the continuing
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scrutiny of a body charged with the duty of protecting the
public interest . This last point is rather obscure .
Almost
all professional associations are established by legislation,
and exercise delegated legislative powers over their members.
It has been thought that, even without explicit mention of
the phrase "public interest", this is the sole purpose of
conferring delegated powers upon a professional body. Thus,
even at the present time , the governing bodies of professions are required to adhere to the public interest, although
some occasionally fall short of that important standard.
Does the new section 93(2) (e) require the incantation of
the magic words "public in terE!st " iri the statute? If so,
most statutes governing the professions would have to be
amended, for what would appear to be purely formal reasons.
On the other hand , if the new section means that a tribunal
or court would look behind the statutory declaration that
the Benchers of the Law Society or the Governing Council
of the College of Physicians and Surgeons are acting in the
public interest , to see if they are actually doing so, it
does not say so with any degree of specificity.
This new approach to professional fee tariffs is
probably of benefit to both the public and the profession,
but likely of only marginal importance. So far as many lay
people are concerned , they cannot afford any fee at all , no ·
matter how it is fixed , no matter how reasonable it might
be on any objective criterion . The cost of drugs, medical
and legal care is beyond the reach of much of our population.
Surely the way to deal with this problem is not to drive
fee levels down through the competitive processes , but
rather to make the services available through medicare or
legal aid schemes .
·"'''••

.,,

\ '••

~(

.,. .. ,,

.... ,..

•-;,,

: '"'·•

"

~- ' ·
!\\ 111
' "'!;

Who would benefit from prohibitions against professional price fixing? In some areas , for example law and architecture , the client who needs and can afford service is
usually not worried about cost; he will pass i t on to the
ul timat.e consumer. For example , lawyers , architects,
engineer~ and realtors all charge fees which become part of
the ultimate cost of building an apartment building and are
reflected in the rent. No doubt a more modest "tariff"
might somewhat reduce building costs. But it i s problematical that any such reduction would lead to a reduction in
rent ; it is much more probable that it would increase the
developer ' s profit margin. On the other hand, of course,
there will be some savings for ultimate consumers. The
redu~tion of realtors ' fees for ordinary purchase and sale
transactions, or of lawyers' fees for routine conveyancing,
will no doubt be of some marginal utility for a sizeable
segment. of our population . But, as I will try to demonstrate,
the real gains i~ bringing professional services within
reach at a reasonable cost lie potentially in quite a
different direction.
I next wish to discuss a group of miscel l aneous
restrictive practices such as prohibitions against advertising, refusals to deal and the like.
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Traditionally, professions have frowned on advertising.
In part this attitude reflects a sense of social distance
from those who are merely engaged in business; in part, it
represents an attempt to ensure that gullible clients are
not attracted to the noisiest, rather than the best ,
members of the profession; and in part it represents a
desire to preserve its established practices and patterns
of relationships . Section 16(1) , however, permits restrictions on advertising so long as they are unrelated to price.
Accordingly, the traditional professional attitudes will
remain undisturbed by the Bill.
Price discrimination, another practice which is prima
facie outlawed by the new legislation , is not really a
problem in many of the professions. However,it may sometimes happen that individual clients receive discriminatory
advantages, either because they are poor or because they
are the source of a good deal of work. But, although
section 38(1) outlaws price discrimination as a general
matter, certain exceptions are provided by section 38(2),
including immunities for price discrimination if it is
not granted " to any significant customer . . . in any market".
It is difficult to see that in many professional situations
a particular client would fall within the definition of
"a significant customer".
Sections 39 and 40 dealing with professional allowances
and other kinds of restrictive practices likewise would
seem to have little or no significance for the professions .
However, to the extent that such restrictive practices do .
fal l within the proscription of these provisions, section
92 - which I have discussed in connection with price
fixing - also provides irrununities against these miscellaneous restrictive practices . Of course, the protection of
section 92 is only available , again, to designated profes sions which are regulated by a public body charged with
protecting the .public interest.
I have deliberately omitted , so far, any mention of
the area in which the impact of the statute is potentially
the greatest :
its prohibitions against monopolization.
The professions typically enjoy monopoly power in relation
to services within their respective jurisdictions. This
monopoly is secured by legislation which forbids laymen to
render the services provided by members of the profession.
Its justification is certainly sound in theory :
professional services require a high degree of skill; those
who already. possess such skill are uniquely qualified to
assess new aspirants;· by certifying their competence , and
admitting them to the ranks of the professional organization, they are identified to the public as qualified
practitioners.
In practice, however, this r ationale for professional
monopoly is not always observed. By this I do not mean to
say that all of the professions , or indeed any of the
professions all · of the time , abuse thei r monopoly. But ,
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there is some evidence to suggest that some professions
may be thought to artificially limit their numbers so as to
maximize the income of their members by creating a scarcity
situation. Again, there is some evidence that some professions may ·refuse to admit members or may discipline and
expel members, for reasons which do not relate to the
protection of the public against dishonesty or incompetence;
and further, some professions, from time to time may be lax
in policing the competence and honesty of their members.
Should we, then, seek to dismantle all professional monopolies or should we rather seek the development of safeguards
which will ensure the protection of · the public against the
abuse of monopoly? As a general matter, the new Bill
prohibits monopolization. Read literally, section 17(a) (ii)
might be construed to apply to attempts to "prevent the
entry of a person into a market" for professional services,
even though the motive for such action is his lack of
professional qualifications. Again, on a purely literal
reading, members of a profession would violate section
17(b) if they "engage in behaviour" that is intended to
place them "together with other persons" in a monopoly
position. This prohibition precisely describes the role
and function of the officers of a professional body. And
note: section 92 provides no immunity for monopolistic
conduct by the professions.
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But the professions need not despair.
It is virtually
certain that the Bill is not intended to dismantle the
whole structure of professional government. Read in context,
section 17 does not appear to be directed towards bodies
exercising delegated governmental authority, as do the
professional bodies. The very fact that section 92 makes
no attempt to immunize professional monopolies suggests
that the draftsmen of the Bill thought that they were not
covered in any event. Surely it would not have been necessary to protect professionals against the innocuous risks
of prosecution for granting promotional allowances, if the
whole structure of the professions was to be overturned.
Even more importantly, it is almost certain that the
Federal Government has no constitutional power to destroy
the system of professional governments created by Provincial
legislation.
Nonetheless, even if we assume that professional monopoly needs to be left intact by . the new Bill, we must still
confront the question of how it is to be channelled into
directions which involve the protection of the public
interest. There are four broad approaches, which are not
n'ecessarily mutually exclusive. The first possibility
would be to introduce elements of public control into the
processes of professional government . This has been done
in Ontario in many professions, following the recommendations of the McRuer Report. It is about to be done on a
much more comprehensive basis in Quebec, following the
recommendations of the Castonguay Report. While the
public presence may in fact ultimately turn out to be
symbolic, it could lead to more careful scrutiny by the
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profession of its public responsibilities. This certainly
is the desired objective of those advocating public representation on the governing boards of .professional bodies.
Second , even if it be conceded that the profession
must maintain a monopoly over work requiring a high level
of skill and knowledge, are there not some tasks which can
be delegated to, or performed entirely by, para-professionals
and technicians? These persons may work either under
the direction of a professional (as do dental hygenists
or law clerks) or be constituted as a separate occupational
group which operates autonomously (as do denturists or lay
advocates) wi th direct relations between "clients" and
themselves .
In either case there wil l be some benefit to the
client in terms of cost savings, although probably the
greatest benefits would be derived from access to autonomous para-professionals.
Before this solution can be implemented, however,
careful analysis is required of the basis of the professions '
asserted claims to the exclusive right to render service.
There must be assurance that the para-professional or
technician is in fact adequate to the task at hand .
Moreover, in making such an assessment , there is the
additional difficulty that the " de-professionalization " of
tasks strikes at the honestly he l d convictions of professionals who tend to favour increased sophistication and
complexity as evidence of increased competence - and as a
value in itself.
Third, there is a possibility of creating countervailing forces and alternative and more efficient institutions for the delivery of professional services.
For example, in legal aid and medicare plans, the
government , either directly or indirectly , bargains with
the profession over the price of services . Not only does
this bargaining process lead to some restraint in charges
imposed upon the ultimate "client" but,as well,cost pressures are generated which may ultimately lead to substan tive reforms. For example , undefended divorces consume a
very large fraction of the total cost of the Ontario Legal
Aid Plan. By moving these from the Supreme to the County
Court, considerable cost savings are effected , which
benefit not only the Plan , but persons who are paying the
cost of their own domestic litigation. Or , to take another
example , t h e high cost of prescriptions led to l egislation
in Ontari o promoting the use of generic rather than brand
name .drugs .
Quite apart from governmental pressures, new experi ments with both medical and legal clinics may lead to the
development of systems for delivering professional services
more cheaply and in a more congenial setting for persons
who could not afford any fee , no matter how low.
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Fourth, certain kinds of substantive reforms which are
generated by professional knowledge and skill may contribute significantly to the reduction of the cost of professional services. Examples which come readily to mind are
reforms in the system of land registry, the use of modular
components in housing construction, and the fluoridation
of the water supply.
In each case, structural solutions
were developed by members of the profession to ultimately
enable consumers to receive the benefit of a professional
service more cheaply or to avoid it altogether.
The point I want to make conce.rning all of these
changes is that they relate basically to substantive,
structural or institutional reforms.
It is from such
reforms, rather than the prospect of enhanced competition,
that in my view the greatest potential benefit to the public
is to be derived.
Whether we look at the professions from the point of
view of economic benefits such as price, innovation, and
efficiency, or from the point of view of social effects,
such as the distribution of social and political power,
the real gains are beyond the reach of any statute such
as the Competition Act.
Such acts operate basically to
sanction offenders rather than to generate affirmative and
fundamental institutional changes.
Perhaps it would be well to conclude with a historical
analogy.
In retrospect, it has often been suggested that
the enactment of our first Combines Act in 1889 was a
gesture of symbolic reassurance designed to register
popular discontent with the growth of uncontrolled economic
and political power within the business community.
As a
force which actually moulded the Canadian economy and its
important industrial and commercial participants, the
legislation probably had minimal impact. Perhaps the
impact of the 'new Competition Act on the professions will
likewise turn out to be mere symbolic reassurance designed
to allay widespread public questionlng of traditional
professional prerogatives.

